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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
On July 9, 2004, the Court of Appeals filed an unpublished memorandum decision,
2004 UT App 228 (2004 WL 1534204), affirming dismissal of plaintiftfappellant
Machelle Canfield's ("Ms. Canfield") appeal from the trial court's ruling granting
appellee/defendant Layton City's (the "City") Rule 26(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. Ms. Canfield petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari,
and her petition was granted as to one issue only. Jurisdiction in this Court is pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a).

II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Issue: Does Ms. Canfield's Complaint state a sufficient claim for the

existence of, and violation of, a contract with the City that is not subject to the immunity
and notice and claim provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-1, et. seq (the "Act")?
Standard of Review: "Compliance with the [Governmental] Immunity
Act is a prerequisite to vesting a district court with subject matter jurisdiction over claims
against governmental entities." Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16, % 9, 40 P.3d 632
(citations omitted). Whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law
reviewed for correctness. Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, f 8, 31 P.3d 1147;
Housing Auth. of County of Salt Lake v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28, f 10, 44 P.3d 724. On
certiorari, this Court gives no deference to the Court of Appeals' conclusions of law. See,
e.g., Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d 346, 350 (Utah 1997).

1

Preservation of Issue: Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction may be
raised at any time, including on or after appeal. Horn v. Utah Dep 't ofPub. Safety, 962
P.2d 95, 99 (Utah 1998); Snyder, 2002 UT 28, f 11,44 P.3d 724; Nielsen v. Gurley, 888
P.2d 130, 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). This issue was preserved in the City's motion to
dismiss and supporting memorandum, in Ms. Canfield's opposition to that motion, and in
the trial court's Order granting the City's motion. See R. 6-8, 9-24,25-27, 28-52, 53-54.
2.

Issue: Do Utah courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over Ms. Canfield's

claims due to her failure to exhaust administrative remedies as set forth in applicable City
policies and procedures and based on Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106?
Standard of Review: Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a
question of law. Beaver County, 2001 UT 81, % 8, 31 P.3d 1147; Snyder, 2002 UT 28,
f 10,44 P.3d 724.
Preservation of Issue: Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction can be
raised at any time, including on or after appeal. Horn, 962 P.2d at 99; Snyder, 2002 UT
28, f 11, 44 P.3d 724; Nielsen, 888 P.2d at 134.
3.

Issue: Is any appeal in this case rendered futile because this lawsuit is

subject to dismissal on grounds of res judicata, inasmuch as substantially the same
complaint was previously dismissed by the federal court in Canfield v. Layton City, Case
No. 1:02CV41 (N.D. Utah), based on Ms. Canfield's failure to comply with the court's
order to amend her complaint, which dismissal is an adjudication on the merits pursuant
toFed.R.Civ.P.41(2)(b)?
Standard of Review: Whether claims are barred by res judicata is a
question of law. Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, \ 20, 70 P.3d 1.

Preservation of Issue: Ms. Canfield raised the issue of res judicata in her
memorandum in opposition to the City's motion to dismiss, by referring to the federal
court's dismissal of the same Complaint that was subsequently filed in this lawsuit. See
R. 28-35, at R. 30-31. Before the City could file a reply, the trial court granted the City's
motion. The City also would have raised res judicata as an affirmative defense in its
Answer. Regardless, an appellate court can affirm on any grounds, even one not relied
upon by the trial court. Hall v. Utah State Dep 't of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, f 21, 24
P.3d 958 (citations omitted). Documents relied on by the City for its res judicata defense
are part of the public record arid subject to judicial notice.1 These public records are
included for the Court's convenience in the Addendum to this brief.

III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The following rules and statutes are determinative:
Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or
against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the
performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or
under the color of authority shall file a written notice of claim with the
entity before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2).

(Governmental Immunity Act).

]

A court may take judicial notice of public records and court filings in other cases.
Moore's Federal Practice ^|12.34[2]. Such records "[are] not viewed as scrutiny of
evidence . . . since facts capable of judicial notice are recorded in sources whose accuracy
is not subject to reasonable question." Id. 1f56.30[3][c]. Thus, even in Rule 12(b)(6)
motions to dismiss, a court may take judicial notice of matters of public records outside
the pleadings without converting the 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment. Id.
U 56.30[4]. Accord, GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381,
1384 (10th Cir. 1997).
%

The governing body of each municipality shall prescribe rules and
regulations which are not inconsistent with the laws of this state, as it deems
best for the efficient administration, organization, operation, conduct and
business of the municipality.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815.

(Utah Municipal Code; Rules and Regulations for
Administration of Municipality).

For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any
order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any
claim against the defendant. Unless the court in its order for dismissal
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not
provided for in this rule, other than dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for
improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as an
adjudication on the merits.
Fed.R.Civ.P.41(2)(b).
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106

Appeals of Terminations (copy of relevant statute
attached in Addendum to this brief as Ex. 14)

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Ms. Canfield's appeal arises from a lawsuit that shefiledin state court on or about
November 25,2002, Case No. 020700620. The history of Ms. Canfield's claims is more
extensive, however, and includes a November 18, 2002 dismissal by the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Utah, of essentially the same Complaint that
she subsequently filed in state court.
A.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following allegations are taken from Ms. Canfield's Complaint:
Ms. Canfield was employed by Layton City as a police dispatcher for

approximately fourteen years prior to her resignation in 2002. R. 1-5. She contends that
she resigned her employment on June 2, 2001 because "officers, employees, agents or
4

servants of [Layton City] confronted [her] with the allegation that [she] had misused sick
leave." R. 9; see also R. 21 (Ms. Canfield's resignation letter). Her Complaint alleges
that a new supervisor in the dispatch area where she worked "unfairly and unjustly
scrutinized [her] work performance" and her use of sick leave, and that she felt the
supervisor's request that she provide medical documentation of the need for sick leave
was "an improper deviation from existing City policy." R. 2-3. She contends that she
resigned because she was confronted with the "ultimatum" of either resigning or facing
termination, and because she feared that "a termination would preclude herfromgaining
future gainful employment." R. 4.
Ms. Canfield alleges that: (1) other employees "have not been punished as severely
as she has, have not been terminated, or not given an ultimatum, but instead, were given
employee warnings, probation, and other punishment," (2) that her alleged punishment,
including her alleged termination, "was disproportionate to the acts alleged," and (3) that
she "has been treated differently from and more severely than other employees of
Defendant, all in contravention of Defendant's specific written policy." R. 4-5. She also
alleges that "Defendant's personnel policy specifically requires that plaintiff be treated
fairly and that any punishments or discipline given to her be proportionate to the offense
alleged." Her Complaint asks for "damages in an amount to be proven at trial." R. 5.
B.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND PRIOR
DISPOSITION
1.

Federal Lawsuit

On or about March 18, 2002, Ms. Canfield filed an Amended Complaint in the
Second Judicial District Court for Davis County. See Canfield v. Layton City (Case No.

020800412), attached in Aplee Add., as Ex. 1. The Amended Complaint is word for word
identical to the Complaint filed herein, except that the Complaint here has added % 12.2
Compare id. with Aplt Add., Ex. B.
Layton City removed this initial state lawsuit to federal court and filed an Answer.
See Answer, Case No. 1:02CV00041 (N.D. Utah), attached in Aplee Add., as Ex. 2. The
basis for removal was the City's belief that the Amended Complaint asserted an equal
protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, over which the federal court would have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Notice of Removal, Aplee Add., Ex. 3.
Ms. Canfield did not object to removal.
At a subsequent scheduling conference, United States Magistrate Judge Ronald N.
Boyce commented that it was unclear what claim Ms. Canfield was asserting. Ms.
Canfield's attorney then stated that there was no equal protection claim, and that Ms.
Canfield was asserting a "disparate treatment" claim under City policies. See Def s Mem.
Supp. Mot. Req. Am. Compl. (Aug. 26, 2002), Aplee Add., Ex. 4.
Based on Magistrate Judge Boyce's comment, on August 22, 2002, District Judge
Dale Kimball, who was presiding over the federal lawsuit, issued an Order to Show Cause
which stated:

2

This added ^J12 states as follows: "Prior to these incidents, in December, 2000,
after being Plaintiffs supervisor for only a few weeks, Lisa Murdock demanded that
Plaintiff provide medical documentation of sick leave used at that time. Plaintiff did not
provide said documentation, although she had it, because she felt that it was an improper
deviation from existing City policy." The City submits that this additional allegation does
not materially alter the substance or gravamen of her Complaint here from Ms. Canfield's
Amended Complaint in the federal lawsuit.
fi

The above-entitled matter was removed from state court on defendant's
contention that plaintiff was asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
plaintiff did not allege such a claim and at pretrial before the magistrate
judge plaintiffs counsel asserted there was no equal protection claim being
pursued. Therefore, the case involves only state issues of violation of
plaintiffs rights under Layton City's civil service standards.
See Order to Show Cause, Aplee Add., Ex. 5. Judge Kimball ordered the parties to show
cause on or before September 28,2002, why the lawsuit should not be remanded to state
court. See id
On August 26, 2002, the City filed a motion to require Ms. Canfield to file an
amended complaint that specifically identified any cause of action which she was
asserting. See Defs' Mot. Req. Am. Compl. (Aug. 26, 2002), Aplee Add., Ex. 6. Ms.
Canfield never responded to the City's motion and she did not file any amended
complaint clarifying the nature of her claims against the City. Instead, on September 20,
2002, her attorney sent a letter to the City's attorneys providing them with a "more
definitive statement as to what my client's claims are." See LetterfromBrad Smith to
Camille N. Johnson, attached as Ex. B to Defs' Resp. to Order to Show Cause, Aplee
Add., Ex. 7. Ms. Canfield's counsel's letter states that she is not asserting an equal
protection claim, and that her claim "is one for constructive termination on the basis that
Layton City failed to follow its own termination policy and deprived Ms. Canfield of her
job without due process of law," and states this would "implicate Federal Fourteenth
Amendment case law." Id.
On September 25, 2002, the City filed a response to the Order to Show Cause, and
attached a copy of Mr. Smith's September 20, 2002 letter. See Defs' Resp. to Order

7

to Show Cause, Aplee Add., Ex. 7. The City's response cited to Mr. Smith's attached
letter and notified the court that "plaintiffs attorney has identified his client's claim as
one for deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution." See id., p. 4. Based on this letter, the City asked the federal court to retain
jurisdiction of the lawsuit and to grant the City's motion requiring Ms. Canfield to amend
her complaint. Id.
Ms. Canfield never filed a response to the federal court's Order to Show Cause,
and never responded or objected to the City's statement to the court that Ms. Canfield had
informed the City that her claim was a due process claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Ms. Canfield also failed to respond to the City's motion that she amend her
complaint. On October 1, 2002, the federal court granted the City's motion requiring Ms.
Canfield to amend her complaint, and ordered her to do so within 30 days. See Order,
Aplee Add., Ex. 8.
Ms. Canfield did not file a second amended complaint as required by the federal
court's October 1,2002 Order. Accordingly, on November 15, 2003, the City filed a
motion to dismiss based on Ms. Canfield's failure to comply with the court's Order. See
Motion to Dismiss & Supp. Mem, Aplee Add., Ex. 9. On November 18, 2002, Judge
Kimball dismissed Ms. Canfield's lawsuit due to her failure to comply with the court's
Order. Order, Aplee Add., Ex. 10.
2.

Subsequent State Lawsuit

On November 25,2002, one week after Judge Kimball dismissed her federal court
lawsuit, Ms. Canfield filed her Complaint in this lawsuit. As discussed above, her

8

Complaint here was virtually identical to the Amended Complaint that had been
dismissed by Judge Kimball.
The City did not answer the Complaint and, on December 23, 2002, filed a Motion
to Dismiss under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), based on lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and grounded in Ms. Canfield's failure to file a Notice of Claim. R. 6-7, 924. On January 17, 2003, Ms. Canfield filed a response to the Motion to Dismiss, where
she admitted that she had not filed a Notice of Claim ®. 30), and contended that her
"complaint alleges a constructive termination and violation of Layton City's written
employment rules including rules regarding the proportionality of employee discipline,
rules relating to consistency among termination, and related matters" ®. 31). She argued
that her Complaint "sounds in contract."3 R. 31. She further contended that her
employment with the City had "a reasonable expectation of its continuance" and that
"[t]here were various policies and procedures in place for termination and discipline."4 R.
32. She cited to the federal lawsuit and incorrectly asserted that the federal lawsuit was
dismissed "on the basis that there was no federal jurisdiction." R. 30-31.
When responding to the City's challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, Ms.
Canfield did not provide the trial court with a copy of any policies and procedures on
3

This assertion is, of course, contrary to Ms. Canfield's attorney's prior
representation that his client's complaint claim asserted a Fourteenth Amendment due
process claim. See Ex. B to Aplee Add., Ex. 7.
4

Ms. Canfield stated in her response that her "prayer for relief includes a prayer for
contract damages with no reference to tort type damages whatsoever." R. 33. In reality,
Ms. Canfield's signed and notarized response to the City's interrogatories in the federal
lawsuit state that she is seeking "general damages for suffering and humiliation," which
are tort damages, not contract damages. See PL's Resp. to Def s Interrog. No. 3, attached
as Ex. 11 in Aplee Add.
9

which she relied for her assertion that her claims sounded in "contract," nor did she cite to
specific City policies or procedures which she claims were breached.5
The City had no opportunity to file a reply memorandum in support of its Motion
to Dismiss because, prior to the due date, the state trial court contacted the City's
attorneys and informed them that the court would grant the City's Motion. On
February 19, 2003, the state trial court filed its Order granting the City's Motion to
Dismiss. R. 53-54. On March 12,2003, Ms. Canfield filed a notice of appeal ®. 56).
On July 9, 2004, the Court of Appeals filed an unpublished memorandum decision,
2004 UT App 228 (2004 WL 1534204), affirming dismissal of Ms. Canfield's appeal
from the trial court's ruling granting the City's Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. She subsequently petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. Her
petition was granted as to one issue.

V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the Court of Appeals' denial of Ms. Canfield's appeal for
the following reasons.
First, Ms. Canfield's Complaint fails on its face to identify any contract or
contractual obligation with the City, and it also fails to allege a breach of any contract by
the City. At best, the Complaint alleges only that Ms. Canfield believes that she was
treated unfairly and differently from other employees, in contravention of the City's
policy. R. 2-5. The words "contract" and "breach" never even appear in Ms. Canfield's

5

Attaching evidence to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion does not convert the motion into
one for summary judgment. Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 UT 82, f 5, 987 P.2d 36.
10

Complaint. The elements of such a claim are simply not pled. There are no allegations in
the Complaint regarding (1) the fact that the parties entered into a contract: (2) the terms
and conditions of any contract; (3) Ms. Canfield's performance under the any contract; or
(4) the City's breach of any contract. Moreover, Ms. Canfield also failed to meet her
burden in the trial court to establish facts sufficient to show subject matter jurisdiction,
because she failed to provide the trial court with any evidence whatsoever of a contract or
any contractual obligation. In light of Ms. Canfield's failure to meet her burden, it was
appropriate for the trial court to rule on the City's Motion to Dismiss prior to the City's
filing a reply brief.
Second, Ms. Canfield's claims cannot be contractual because they are grounded in
statute since they arise out of the Legislature's mandate that municipalities enact rules
and regulations as they "deem best" to govern their operations. The City's internal
discipline and/or termination grievance procedures fall within this statutory grant. The
Utah Court of Appeals also has recognized that public employers promulgate rules and
regulations pursuant to statute and not from contract. Moreover, Utah Code Ann. § 10-31106 (2002) is the basis for the City's termination appeals procedure.
Third, this Court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction due to Ms. Canfield's failure
to exhaust administrative remedies by pursuing a grievance or appeal with the City.
Fourth, this lawsuit is properly dismissed on grounds of res judicata or claim
preclusion because not only are the parties and Complaint the same as those in the
previous federal lawsuit, but the federal court's dismissal of Ms. Canfield's lawsuit, based

11

on her failure to comply with the court's order, constitutes a dismissal on the merits under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

VI. ARGUMENT
A.

MS. CANFIELD'S COMPLAINT FAILS TO PLEAD A CONTRACT
CLAIM.
1.

The Complaint Fails On Its Face To State A Sufficient Claim For The
Existence Of A Contract With The City, Or The Breach Of A Contract.

Ms. Canfield contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her lawsuit for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction because her Complaint "sounds in contract" and she
therefore was not subject to the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act
("Act"). This argument is without merit.
"Compliance with the [Governmental] Immunity Act is a prerequisite to vesting a
district court with subject matter jurisdiction over claims against governmental entities."
Wheeler, 2002 UT 16, f 9, 40 P.3d 632 (citations omitted). Since "[s]ubject matter
jurisdiction [implicates] the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy
presented by the action before it," "[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject
matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." Fort Trumbull Conservancy v. City of
New London, 829 A.2d 801, 806 & 806 n.12 (Conn. 2003) (internal citation omitted).
Utah law mandates strict compliance with the requirements of the Act. Utah Code
Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -38. Under the Act, a claim against a political subdivision is barred
unless a notice of claim is filed with the governing body of the political subdivision
within one year after the claim arises. Id. § 63-30-11 and -13; Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth.,
618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 1980). Compliance with the notice provisions of the Act is a
12

condition precedent to maintaining suit (Hall v. Utah State Dep V of Corrections, 2001
UT, Tf 23,24 P.2d 958), and the burden of filing a notice of claim rests entirely with the
plaintiff (Shunk v. State, 924 P.2d 879, 882 (Utah 1996)). The requirements of the Act
must be strictly complied with or dismissal of the action is mandated (Hall, 2001 UT 34,
123, 24 P.3d 958), and failure to comply precisely with notice requirements deprives a
court of subject matter jurisdiction (Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109, f 16, 24
P.3dll56).
The purpose of a notice of claim '"is to require every claimant to clearly state all
of the elements of his claim to the city council"' and to "afford the political subdivision
an opportunity to investigate the claim while the matter is of recent memory, witnesses
are yet available, conditions have not materially changed and to determine if there is
liability, and if there is, the extent of it." Hall, 2001 UT 34, ^ 23, 24 P.3d 958 (citation
omitted); see also Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343, 345-46 (Utah 1998).
Based on these standards, Ms. Canfield's Complaint was properly dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. First, the Complaint on its face fails to assert a
contract. The word "contract" never appears in the Complaint, and the Complaint fails to
identify any specific contract or contractual provision. The basis of Ms. Canfield's claim
is that she was treated "unfairly" and/or differently from other employees and, at most,
the Complaint generally alludes to "City policy" ®. 12), "Defendant's specific written
policy" ®. 4), and "personnel policy" ®. 4), but she fails to identify, quote from, or attach
the specific policy in question. These general references do not show a contract between
Ms. Canfield and the City. This is particularly true since the City's Policy Manual states
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that "[t]he policies and statements contained in this manual and in other statements that
may be issued from time to time, do not create a contract or agreement of any kind
between the City and its employees." See Layton City Policy Manual, Ex. 12 in Aplee
Add.
Second, Ms. Canfield's Complaint fails to plead the elements of a contract claim.
As support for her argument that she has pleaded a contract claim, Ms. Canfield cites Bair
v. Axiom Design, 2001 UT 20, ^ 4, 20 P.3d 388, for the following elements of a breach of
contract claim: "(1) a contract, (2) performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach
of the contract by the other party, and (4) damages." However, comparison to Bair only
underscores the deficiencies in Ms. Canfield's Complaint, since in Bair there were
express written contracts that were executed by the two parties (Bair, 2001 UT 20,
ff 2,3,6), and in this case there was no express, written contract that was executed by Ms.
Canfield and the City. In addition, since Ms. Canfield admits that she resigned6 and does
not allege in the Complaint that she was denied access to any grievance procedure, she
has not performed under the so-called contract. Furthermore, since she resigned her
employment, it is difficult to see how the City could have breached any contract. Finally,
regarding alleged damages, Ms. Canfield's Complaint in this lawsuit is virtually identical
to the Complaint removed to the federal court (compare Am. Compl., Case No.
020800412 (Ex. 1 to Add. to Aplee. Brf.) to Complaint, Case No. 020700620 (Ex. B to

6

Based on the allegations in her Complaint, Ms. Canfield was not constructively
terminated. "If an employee resigns of her own free will, even as a result of the
employer's actions, the employee will not be held to have been constructively
discharged." Heno v. Sprint/United Mgmt Co., 208 F.3d 847, 858 (10th Cir. 2000)
(citation omitted).
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Aplt. Brf), and she admitted to the Court of Appeals that, in response to interrogatories in
the federal lawsuit, she requested damages based on tort. See Aplt. Reply Brf., p. 3 n.2.
Third, Ms. Canfield's Complaint fails to show any breach or violation of a contract
by the City. Ms. Canfield contends that: (1) she resigned because "officers, employees,
agents or servants of [Layton City] confronted [her] with the allegation that [she] had
misused sick leave" ®. 9), and (2) she resigned when faced with either resigning or
termination because she feared that "a termination would preclude her from gaining
future gainful employment" ®. 4). These allegations fall far short of the requisite
pleadings for alleging a breach of any contractual obligation by the City.
Fourth, in opposing the City's Motion to Dismiss, Ms. Canfield failed to provide
the trial court with a copy of (or citation of language from) a "contract," or a personnel
policy, and relied solely on argument. This is significant, since it was Ms. Canfield's
burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction and she failed to provide evidence to meet
that burden. A plaintiff that fails to meet this burden should not be allowed on appeal to
complain of the trial court's alleged error.
2.

Any Employment Rights Of Ms. Canfield Were Grounded In Statute.

Although Ms. Canfield's explanations of the nature of her claim have varied, her
claims could not be contractual because they are grounded in statute. Under Utah law, it
is mandatory that municipalities prescribe rules and regulations as they "deem best" to
efficiently administer the municipality and its operations:
The governing body of each municipality shall prescribe rules and
regulations which are not inconsistent with the laws of this state, as it deems
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best for the efficient administration, organization, operation, conduct and business
of the municipality.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815. The City has adopted such operational policies, including
procedures related to termination and/or discipline of its employees which are consistent
with Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106. These operational policies accordingly are grounded
in statute.
For example, in Knight v. Salt Lake County, 2002 UT App. 100, 46 P.3d 247, the
trial court ruled there was no contract in a situation where public employees were
employed pursuant to the County Personnel Management Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-331 to -15. Id. at \ 4. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that any alleged rights were
statutory, not contractual. Id. atfflf7-9. In making this ruling, the court in Knight
commented that "public employees' employment rights generally spring not from
contract, but from legislative policy," {Id. at If 8), and cited as persuasive the following
statement by the Kansas Supreme Court which notes the lack of analogy between public
and private employees:
"There neither is, not can be, an analogy of statuses between public
employees and private employees, in fact or law, because of the inherent
differences in the employment relationship arising out of the unique fact
that the public employer was established by and is run for the benefit of all
the people and its authority derives not from contract nor the profit
motive inherent in the principle of free private enterprise, but from the
constitution, statutes, civil service rules, regulations and resolutions."
Id. at If 8 n.7 (quoting Wright v. Kansas Water Office, 881 P.2d 567, 571 (Kan. 1994))
(emphasis in original).
As additional support for the contract/statute distinction, Knight cited Weese v.
Davis County Commission, 834 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1992), as stating that "[t]he county only
16

has those rights and powers granted it by the Utah Constitution and statutes or those
implied as a necessary means to accomplish them.'VM at U 8 n.7.
Ms. Canfield disputes Knight's relevance in this case and, quoting Knight,
contends that rights can be contractual and not statutory where there is "evidence of an
agreement that 'altered or added to the terms and conditions of public employment.'" See
Aplt's Opening Brf., p. 11 (citations omitted). This argument does not assist Ms.
Canfield's contract argument here, however, because she has failed to plead or show an
agreement in her case that altered or added to the terms of her employment.
Ms. Canfield also contends that the Court of Appeals in Knight improperly relied
on Horn v. Utah Department of Public Safety, 962 P.2d 95 (Utah 1998), in finding that
any alleged rights were statutory. See Aplt's Opening Brf., p. 11. However, Ms. Canfield
fails to show how Horn is distinguishable from her own situation and, in fact, she
concedes that there was nothing to create an implied contract in Horn so as to alter the
statutory nature of the claim. Ms. Canfield likewise has failed to cite to anything that
would alter the statutory nature of her claims.
Moreover, Ms. Canfield's reliance on Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College,
636 P.2d 1063 (1981), as being "comparable to her case" is misplaced. See Aplt's
Opening Brf, p. 13. In Piacitelli, there was no contention that the plaintiffs alleged
rights were statutory and not contractual,7 and in fact there is no discussion whatsoever of

1

Piacitelli \s also distinguishable because the plaintiff was told by the college that
he would not receive a contract for the upcoming year, and his objection was that he was
not allowed to avail himself of the due process procedures provided in the personnel
policy. By contrast, Ms. Canfield admits she resigned, and contends she is not required to
exhaust the administrative (due process) procedures provided in the City's Handbook.
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a statutory basis for plaintiff s alleged rights. Id. at 1064-65.
In sum, based on these standards and on the grant of authority to municipalities in
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815, any alleged rights of the City's employees are statutory and
not contractual.
3.

The Implied Contract Exception To At-Will Employment Is Irrelevant
Here.

As support for her contention that her Complaint establishes a contract on its face,
Ms. Canfield cites Utah case law addressing the implied contract exception to the general
rule of "at-will" employment. See Aplt's Opening Brf., pp. 7-8 (citing Benibe v. Fashion
Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989); Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, Utah, Inc.,
Ill P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 1989); Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 56 (Utah
1991)). These cases stand for the proposition that an implied contract may create an
exception to the "at-will" rule, thereby requiring that any termination be "for cause."
This argument and the cited case law are inapplicable here. First, all of these cases
involve private employees, not public employees. Second, Ms. Canfield does not appear
to claim that she was an "at-will" employee. Third, unlike the employees in the cited
cases, Ms. Canfield was never terminated; rather, she resigned her employment.
Moreover, Ms. Canfield cannot argue that the City's Policy Manual created some
type of implied contract, because the City's Policy Manual expressly states that "[t]he
policies and statements contained in this manual and in other statements that may be
issued from time to time, do not create a contract or agreement of any kind between the
City and its employees." See Layton City Policy Manual, Ex. 12 in Aplee Add.
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4.

An Implied Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing Is Not Itself A
Contract.

There is no merit to Ms. Canfield's contention that her Complaint establishes on its
face a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and that this is sufficient to
show a contract claim. See Aplt's Opening Brf., pp. 8-10 (citing as support Beck v.
Farmers Ins. Exch, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985); Dubois v. Grand Central, 872 P.2d 1073
(Utah Ct. App. 1994); Cooks v. lions First Nat 7 Bank, 919 P.2d 56 (Utah Ct. App.
1996)). First, the Complaint does not state on its face the existence of a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. In fact, there is no reference to any such covenant in the
Complaint. Moreover, a good faith and fair dealing covenant cannot exist alone, and only
exists where there is a contract in which it is grounded. See Dubois, 872 P.2d at 1078-79.
Inasmuch as Ms. Canfield has failed to allege the existence of any contract, she cannot
assert that her Complaint includes a claim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.
5.

No Utah Case Law Supports Ms. Canfield's Position, And The Case
Law She Cites From Other Jurisdictions Is Inapplicable.

Ms. Canfield's appeal fails to cite any Utah case law dealing with the
Governmental Immunity Act that supports her position because there is no such law.
Furthermore, the cases from other jurisdictions cited by Ms. Canfield do not apply here.
For example, Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District, 918 P.2d 7 (N.M.
1996), involved an employee who was demoted with a reduction in pay, whose lawsuit
alleged that he was not provided with notice of the basis for his demotion or given a
chance to improve. Id. at 730. That is not the situation here. There also is nothing in
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Garcia to show whether a notice of claim was required prior to bringing the lawsuit.
Most important, unlike here, Garcia was not a case where the plaintiff was required to
show that a contract and breach were pled on the face of the complaint.
The second case cited by Ms. Canfield, Harris v. State Personnel Board., 216 CaL
Rptr. 274 (Ct. App. 1985), is also inapplicable. In that case, the employee's claim was a
mandamus claim for unpaid back wages. Id. at 276. The court noted that the notice of
claim requirement did not apply because this was a mandamus claim, and like claims for
injunctive or declaratory relief, was not subject to that requirement. By contrast, in this
case Ms. Canfield has not pled a mandamus or other equitable claim.
C.

THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS LACK SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION BECAUSE MS. CANFIELD FAILED TO EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
Ms. Canfield contends in her appellate brief and Complaint that she was

constructively terminated. Taking Ms. Canfield's Complaint at face value, this lawsuit
should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to her failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
Utah law makes clear that courts lack subject matter jurisdiction when a plaintiff
fails to exhaust administrative procedures or remedies. For example, in Patterson v.
American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, 67 P.3d. 466, the Court dismissed claims brought by a
real estate developer because the developer failed to exhaust administrative remedies
under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(1). Id.fflf14-16. Patterson recognized that § 10-91001 authorizes municipalities to adopt administrative procedures to govern land use
decisions, and that American Fork City had done so in its Development Code. Id. f 16.

20

This Court found that the developer's failure to exhaust these procedures resulted in a
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. \ 17; see also id.ffl[18-19 (discussing failure to
exhaust remedies).
Likewise, Ms. Canfield has also failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Utah
statutory law gives municipalities the authority to prescribe policies and procedures to
govern their efficient operation as the municipalities "deem best," so long as the policies
and procedures do not conflict with laws of the state. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815. The
City has done so by establishing procedures for employees to present grievances and
object to disciplinary actions, performance evaluations, and termination, including an
appeals process. See Layton City Policies and Procedures, attached as Ex. 13 to Aplee
App. These policies and procedures regarding termination comport with and are based on
the procedures and rights set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106, including giving the
employee the opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence.
Although Ms. Canfield contends she was constructively terminated and treated
differently with regard to the City's policies and procedures, she fails to allege that she
has been denied access to a grievance/appeals procedure, and indeed she has not. There
is nothing in the record to indicate that Ms. Canfield ever attempted to avail herself of the
City's available grievance/appeals procedure and, in fact, it is undisputed that she did not
do so. In light of the Legislature's broad grant of authority to municipalities to regulate
"operations" as the municipality "deems best," Ms. Canfield was bound to pursue these
internal remedies before bringing a lawsuit.
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The fact that the exhaustion requirement applies to internal grievance and
termination procedures of governmental entities is illustrated in numerous cases. For
example, in Long v. Samson, 568 N.W.2d 602 (N.D. 1997), the North Dakota Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of contract
and tort claims by a professor who was formerly employed by the University of North
Dakota. Id. at 606. In affirming, the court agreed with the trial court that the professor
had failed to exhaust internal administrative remedies set forth in a Faculty Handbook.
Id. at 603-604. As justification for the exhaustion requirement, the court pointed to the
following language in a prior decision involving a doctor who failed to exhaust
administrative remedies at the hospital where she was employed:
"... an exhaustion of remedies requirement serves the salutary function of
eliminating or mitigating damages. If an organization is given the
opportunity quickly to determine through the operation of its internal
procedures that it has committed error, it may be able to minimize, and
sometimes eliminate, any monetary injury to the plaintiff by immediately
reversing its initial decision and affording the aggrieved party all
membership rights; an individual should not be permitted to increase
damages by foregoing available internal remedies.... Moreover, by
insisting upon exhaustion even in these circumstances, courts accord
recognition to the 'expertise' of the organization's quasi-judicial tribunal,
permitting it to adjudicate the merits of plaintiff s claim in the first instance.
. . . Finally, even if the absence of an internal damage remedy makes
ultimate resort to the courts inevitable . . . the prior judicial efficiency will
still promote judicial efficiency by unearthing the relevant evidence and by
providing a record which the court may review."
Id. at 605 (citation omitted). This is consistent with other courts which have held that an
employee must exhaust internal grievance procedures.8

%

See, e.g., Bockover v. Perko, 34 Cal. Rptr.2d 423 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (fired
employee of public university laboratory must exhaust internal grievance procedure
before filing lawsuit); Aranoffv. Bryan, 569 A.2d 466, 469-470 (Vt. 1989) (law clerk for
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In this case, Ms. Canfield grounds her claims in the City's policies and procedures,
but she has failed to allege that she has exhausted the grievance and/or appeals procedures
applicable to those policies and procedures. If Ms. Canfield or other Utah public
employees are permitted to file lawsuits without first exhausting internal remedies, the
judicial system risks inundation with employment-related claims by public employees,
which are more properly dealt with in the first instance through internal grievance
procedures. In light of this failure by Ms. Canfield to avail herself of the remedies
included in the very policies which she now contends amount to a contract, this Court
should find that there is a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
D.

MS. CANFIELD'S LAWSUIT IS BARRED ON GROUNDS OF RES
JUDICATA.
In Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court stated

that claim preclusion bars a lawsuit if: (1) the prior and present lawsuit involve the same
parties or their privies, (2) the claim alleged to be barred was presented in the first lawsuit
or could and should have been raised, and (3) thefirstlawsuit resulted in afinaljudgment
on the merits. Id. at 247; see also Maoris & Assoc, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93,
120, 16P.3d 1214.
In this case, each of the three elements of claim preclusion are satisfied. First, the
parties in the prior federal lawsuit are identical to the parties in this lawsuit. Second, it is
obvious that the claim presented in the prior federal lawsuit is the same claim presented in

state court must exhaust grievance procedure injudicial branch Personnel Policy before
filing lawsuit); Edgren v. Regents of Univ. of Cal, 205 Cal. Rptr. 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(dismissal of lawsuit appropriate because architect employed by state university failed to
exhaust internal grievance policies).
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this lawsuit because the underlying complaints in the two lawsuits are virtually identical.
Third, the dismissal of the prior federal lawsuit constitutes afinaljudgment on the merits.
Specifically, there was an adjudication on the merits because the federal lawsuit was
dismissed based on Ms. Canfield's failure to comply with the federal court's Order. See,
e.g., Henderson v. Consolidated Merck Corp., 286 F. Supp. 697, 698 (N.D. Ga. 1968)
(dismissal due to failure to comply with court's order is adjudication on the merits under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41).
The record shows that the federal court dismissed Ms. Canfield's lawsuit because
she failed to comply with the court's direct order that she file a second amended
complaint to state her claim(s) specifically. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41,
dismissal for failure to comply with a court order operates as an adjudication on the
merits:9
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any
order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any
claim against the defendant. Unless the court in its order for dismissal
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not
provided for in this rule, other than dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for
improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates-as an
adjudication on the merits.
Fed.R.Civ.P.41(2)(b).
Filings in the federal district court show that, after the court issued an Order to
Show Cause why the lawsuit should not be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, Ms.

9

This Court has noted that Utah Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 41, which is
substantially the same as the federal rule, definitively operates as an adjudication on the
merits unless a dismissal was for lack ofjurisdiction, improper venue, or lack of an
indispensable party. Madsen, 769 P.2d at 248.
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Canfield informed the City's attorneys that her claim was one for due process and
implicated the Fourteenth Amendment. See IV.B.l, supra (discussing federal lawsuit).
Ms. Canfield never filed a response to the federal court's Order to Show Cause, never
responded or objected when the City submitted to the federal court the letter in which she
admitted that her claim was one for due process implicating the Fourteenth Amendment,
and never responded or objected when the City informed the federal court that Ms.
Canfield had stated that her claim was a due process claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id.
Significantly, the federal court did not follow through on its Order to Show Cause
by dismissing the lawsuit at that time. Instead, the Federal court retained jurisdiction of
the lawsuit and, on October 1, 2002, it granted the City's motion requesting that Ms.
Canfield be ordered to amend her Complaint, and gave Ms. Canfield thirty days in which
to do so.10 See Order, Aplee Add., Ex. 8.
Ms. Canfield did not amend her complaint as required by the federal court's
October 1, 2002 Order and, on November 15,2003, the Cityfileda motion to dismiss
based on her failure to comply with this court order. See Aplee Add., Ex. 9. On
November 18, 2002, Judge Kimball dismissed Ms. Canfield's lawsuit due to her failure to
comply with the court's October 1, 2002 Order. See Order, Aplee Add., Ex. 10.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Ms. Canfield's lawsuit was dismissed due to
her failure to comply with the court's order to file a second amended complaint, and not

10

The federal court's Order was clearly based on the City's response to the Order to
Show Cause wherein it had notified the court of Ms. Canfield's admission that she was
asserting a claim that implicated the Fourteenth Amendment.
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because of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The federal court's dismissal of Ms.
Canfield's prior lawsuit therefore was a dismissal on the merits and, as a result, this
lawsuit is barred by claim preclusion under the doctrine of res judicata.

VII. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the City respectfully submits that the trial court's
dismissal of Ms Canfield's lawsuit should be affirmed.
DATED this 16th day of February, 2005.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Stanley J.
Camille N. Johnson
Judith D. Wolferts
Maralyn M. Reger
Attorneys for Appellee/Defendant Layton City
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Brad C. Smith, NO. 6656
STEVENSON & SMITH. P.C.
2605 Washington B l v d . , S u i t e 300
Ogden. Utah 84401
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 3 9 4 - 4 5 7 3

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVTS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MACHELL.E CANFIELD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

AMENDED COMPLAINT

:

Civil No. 020800412
Judge: Glen R. Dawson

LAYTON CITY, a Utah
municipality,
Defendant.
Comes now Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and complains
and alleges of Defendant as follows:
PARTIES, JURIfiPICTIOM a VENUE
1.

Machelle Canfield is a resident of Weber County, State of
Utah.

2.

Defendant Layton City, is a Utah municipality, located in
Davis County, State of Utah.

3.

Venue and jurisdiction are proper in the above-entitled
court.

20/02

WED 12:52 FAX 801 548 * J k

l£J UUH

UYTON CITY ADMIN,

ThCTOhL ALLBGVTIQHfl
4.

Plaintiff was employed as a police department dispatcher for
Defendant, Layton City,

Prior to July 2001, Plaintiff had

been employed by Defendant for in excess of thirteen (13)
years.

During that period of time she was a police

dispatcher.

Approximately six months prior to the

termination of her employment. Plaintiff was placed under
the charge of a new supervisor, Lisa Murdock.
5.

Ms. Murdock unfairly and unjustly scrutinized the work
performance of Plaintiff and created a hostile, tense and
stressful envirorment, in an area that is already stress
ridden,

6.

On 12 June 2 001, Plaintiff left work due to stress and
informed Lisa Murdock that she was going to take her
daughter to the doctor's office.

Plaintiff reported said

hours on her time sheet.
7.

Due to the stress situation, Plaintiff decided it was best
not to go back to work until Lt, Moyes had returned and we
could resolve th« situation.

Plaintiff spoke with Lt* Moyes

on Monday morning, June 11th! and he had asked if Plaintiff
should be alright until he got back.

Plaintiff thought she

would.
8.

On Tuesday, the 12th, Plaintiff left 4.5 hours early, and
that evening she called dispatch to have her shift filled
for the next day.
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Lisa called Plaintiff back and said that Plaintiff needed to
be at work.

Plaintiff went to work at 7:00 a.m.

When

Plaintiff came in to work later in the morning, Lisa asked
if she needed to leave.

Plaintiff said if 5he could skip

lunch and go home early it would be better.

Lisa said she

would see what she could do since she is the lunch relief,
Lisa came up several hours later Mid told Plaintiff to go t
lunch.

Plaintiff assumed that meant she was not: going home

early,
10.

In the meantime Plaintiff's daughter called on he cell phone
and said that her knee and ankle were hurting from the
basketball camp that morning.

(She has had other ankle

injuries).
11.

At 2:00 p.m. Lisa came back to dispatch and told Plaintiff
she could leave.

Plaintiff was surprised.

Plaintiff was

walking out the door and Lisa said she would need a doctor's
excuse for the one hour she was leaving early.
12.

Plaintiff is

informed and believes, and thereupon alleges,

that numerous employees of City have used sick leave in the
same manner as Plaintiff but have not been subject: to any
disciplinary proceeding whatsoever.

Accordingly* Plaintiff

has been treated differently from and more severely than
other employees of Defendant, all in contravention of
Defendant's specific written policy.
13.

Officers, employees, agents

or servants of Defendant
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confronted Plaintiff with the allegation that Plaintiff had
misused sick l«ava and gave her an ultimatum that she resign
from the city or face termination.

Because of her fear that

a termination would preclude her from obtaining future
gainful employment, Plaintiff and reluctantly and against
her will accepted termination.
14.

Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges
that other employees of City have been subject to
allegations regarding misuse of sick leave and/or other
instances in which they have been accused, rightly or
wrongly, of stealing city property, misusing city time or
similar allegations-

15.

Plaintiff is informed and believes and there upon alleges
that eaid individuals have not been punished as severely as
she has, have not been terminated,, or not given an
ultimatum, but instead, were given employee warnings,
probation, and other punishment.

16.

Defendant's personnel policy specifically require that
Plaintiff be treated fairly and that any punishments or
discipline given to her be proportionate to the offense
alleged.

Defendant's punishment of Plaintiff, including its

termination of her, was disproportionate to the acts
alleged, even if the acts were taken as true.

WED 12:53 hAA ouj. ow

WHEREFORE,. Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendant as
follows;
1.

For damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

2.

For reinstatement or other appropriate remedy.

3.

For costs of court and attorney's fees as the same may
be allowed by law.

4.

For such other and further relief as the court deems
just and proper,

DATED

this Sf

day of March* 2
Brad C. Smith
Attorney for Plaintiff

Plaintiffs Address:
3S52 W. 5000 S.
Roy, Utah B4067

ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT 2

STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119)
CAMTLLE N. JOHNSON (A5494)
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
MACHELLE CANFIELD,
DEFENDANT LAYTON CITY'S
ANSWER TO AMENDED
COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality,
Defendant.

Case N a

Judge

Defendant Layton City hereby answers plaintiffs Amended Complaint as follows:
PARTIES. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the

truth of the allegations of paragraph 1 of the Amended Complaint, and on that basis denies the
allegations of paragraph 1 of the Amended Complaint.
2.

Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 2 of the Amended Complaint.

3.

The allegations contained in paragraph 3 of the Amended Complaint are legal

conclusions consisting of allegations regarding jurisdiction and venue, and require no answer. To
the extent paragraph 3 requires an answer, defendant denies each and every allegation.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
4.

Defendant admits that plaintiff was employed as a police department dispatcher for

Layton City and had held that position for more than 13 years at the time of her resignation.
Defendant admits and affirmatively asserts that approximately six months prior to her resignation,
plaintiff was placed under the charge of a new supervisor, Lisa Murdock. Defendant denies the
remaining allegations of paragraph 4 of the Amended Complaint.
5.

Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 5 of the Amended Complaint.

6.

In response to the allegations of paragraph 6 of the Amended Complaint,

defendant admits that on June 12, 2001, plaintiff left work early informing her supervisor Lisa
Murdock that she was going to take her daughter to the doctor's office. Defendant admits that
plaintiff reported 4.5 hours sick leave for June 12, 2001. Defendant denies the remaining
allegations of paragraph 6 of the Amended Complaint.
7.

In response to the allegations of paragraph 7 of the Amended Complaint,

defendant admits that plaintiff spoke with Lt. Moyes on June 11, 2001. Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of paragraph
7 of the Amended Complaint concerning plaintiffs thoughts and decision and on that basis denies
those allegations. Defendant denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 7 of the Amended
Complaint.
8.

In response to the allegations of paragraph 8 of the Amended Complaint,

defendant admits that plaintiff left her shift early on June 12, 2001 and that she called in sick to
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dispatch for the next day. Defendant denies the remaining allegations in paragraph 8 of the
Amended Complaint.
9.

In response to the allegations of paragraph 9 of the Amended Complaint,

defendant admits that Lisa Murdock told plaintiff that she needed to come to work on June 13,
2001. Defendant admits that plaintiffs time sheet reflects that she reported to work at 7:00 a.m.
on June 13, 2001. The remaining allegations of paragraph 9 of the Amended Complaint are vague
and ambiguous and on that basis defendant denies them.
] 0.

Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to

plaintiffs cell phone calls, and on that basis denies the allegations of paragraph 10 of the
Amended Complaint.
11.

In response to the allegations of paragraph 11 of the Amended Complaint,

defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to plaintiflPs thoughts
and the other allegations are vague and ambiguous, and on that basis defendant denies the
allegations of paragraph 11 of the Amended Complaint.
12.

As to the allegations of paragraph 12 of the Amended Complaint, defendant admits

that employees of Layton City have used sick leave. Defendant denies the remaining allegations
of paragraph 12 of the Amended Complaint.
13.

In response to the allegations of paragraph 13 of the Amended Complaint,

defendant admits that it confronted plaintiff with her violation of Layton City and Police
Department Policies and that plaintiff resigned her employment. Defendant is without knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations concerning plaintiffs
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"fear" and on that basis denies those allegations. Defendant denies the remaining allegations of
paragraph 13 of the Amended Complaint.
14.

In response to the allegations of paragraph 14 of the Amended Complaint,

defendant admits that other City employees have been accused of violating City policy.
Defendant denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 14 of the Amended Complaint.
15.

Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 15 of the Amended Complaint.

16.

In response to the allegations of paragraph 16 of the Amended Complaint,

defendant asserts that its personnel policy speaks for itself and any attempt to characterize it is
denied. Defendant denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 16 of the Amended Complaint.
Defendant denies the allegations of that paragraph of the Amended Complaint which
begins "WHEREFORE."
Defendant denies all allegations in the Amended Complaint that relate or are directed to
defendant unless those allegations are expressly admitted in the Answer.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
As separate and distinct affirmative defenses to plaintiffs causes of action against
defendant in the Amended Complaint, defendant alleges as follows:
First Affirmative Defense
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Second Affirmative Defense
Plaintiffs claims as asserted in the Amended Complaint are barred by the applicable
statutes of limitations, including, without limitation, §§ 78-12-23(2), 78-12-25(1) and (3), 78-1228, 78-12-29 and 78-12-30, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).
4

Third Affirmative Defense
Defendant is immune and/or this action is barred, in whole or in part, by virtue of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, § 63-30-1 et seq., Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), including,
without limitation, §§ 63-30-3, -4, -5, -10, -11, -13, -15, and -19, and by plaintiffs failure to
comply with the provisions of said Act. In any event, defendant's liability is limited by said Act,
as provided by, inter alia, § 63-30-34, Utah Code Ann, (1953, as amended).
Fourth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiffs claims are not actionable as pled.
Fifth Affirmative Defense
Defendant specifically denies violating any federal or state constitutional, statutory, or
common law right of the plaintiff.
Sixth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint is unconstitutionally vague, and constitutes a denial of due
process.
Seventh Affirmative Defense
Plaintiff has failed to mitigate her damages, if any. Plaintiff is thereby barred in whole or
in part from recovering monetary damages from defendant. In addition, or alternatively, any
compensation or benefits received by plaintiff after her resignation, including unemployment
compensation, must be applied to reduce any damages claimed by plaintiff

5

Eighth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiff voluntarily terminated her employment, and is, therefore, estopped and has
waned any right to bring claims or seek damages or other relief from any defendant, including but
not limited to reinstatement, back pay, or future pay.
Ninth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiff waived her rights, if any, to seek damages or other relief from defendant.
Tenth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiff is estopped from asserting any and all causes of action against defendant.
Eleventh Affirmative Defense
Plaintiff is barred under the doctrine of unclean hands from all forms of equitable relief
sought in her Amended Complaint.
Twelfth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiff is barred under the doctrine of laches from all forms of relief sought in her
Amended Complaint.
Thirteenth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiff has failed to exhaust applicable procedural, administrative, statutory or judicial
remedies otherwise available to her, and this action is therefore barred, in whole or in part.
Fourteenth Affirmative Defense
All acts or omissions of defendant were undertaken in good faith, without malice, with
probable cause, and were fully justified and reasonable under the circumstances.
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Fifteenth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiffs actions violated applicable rules, regulations, policies, procedures, and/or
standards of behavior. Any actions of defendant were in response to plaintiffs actions and were
reasonable and justified under the circumstances.
Sixteenth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiffs punitive damages claim, if any, must be established in accordance with Utah
Code Ann. §78-18-1.
Seventeenth Affirmative Defense
As a matter of law, plaintiffis not entitled to recover punitive or exemplary damages from
defendant.
Eighteenth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiff must prove her claim for punitive damages by a unanimous verdict, and the
burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nineteenth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiffs punitive damage claims are barred by the prohibition ofex postfacto laws in
Article I, Section 18 of the Utah Constitution, and the Open Courts provision, Article I, Section II
of the Utah Constitution.
Twentieth Affirmative Defense
Defendant did not act with actual malice or reckless indifference, and any award of
punitive damages is barred.

7

Twenty-First Affirmative Defense
The punitive damages claims are barred by the United States Constitution and
amendments thereto, including: Article I, Section 10[1] (Contracts Clause); Fifth Amendment
(Due Process); Eighth Amendment (Cruel and Unusual Punishment; Excessive Fines); and
Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process and Equal Protection).
Twenty-Second Affirmative Defense
The punitive damages claims are barred by the Constitution of Utah, including Article 1,
Section 7 (Due Process), Section 9 (Excessive Fines; Cruel and Unusual Punishment), and
Section 12 (Self-incrimination).
Twenty-Third Affirmative Defense
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, defendant is entitled to recover reasonable
attorneys' fees against plaintiff on the grounds that this action, in whole or in part, is brought
without merit and has not been brought or asserted in good faith.
Twenty-Fourth Affirmative Defense
Defendant is protected by the doctrines of qualified and good faith immunity both at
common and under statutory law.
Twenty-Fifth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiffs recovery, if any, is limited by Utah Code Ann., §§ 63-30-22 and -34.
Twenty-Sixth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiffs damages, if any, were not caused by an official policy or custom of defendant.

8

Twenty-Seventh Affirmative Defense
Defendant cannot be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
WHEREFORE, defendant prays judgment as follows:
1.

That plaintiff take nothing from defendant by way of her Amended Complaint, and

that the Amended Complaint against defendant be dismissed, with prejudice;
2.

That defendant be awarded its costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees

incurred herein; and
3.

That this Court award such other andfartherrelief as it may deem just.

DATED this %_

day of April, 2002.
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU

Stanley J. Preston
'
Camille N. Johnson
Maralyn M. Reger
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City

N:\13607\520\Plcadings\Answer to Amended Complaint2.wpd
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT 3

STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119)
CAMLLEN. JOHNSON (A5494)
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
MACHELLE CANFIELD,
p,aintiff

>

NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF A CIVIL
ACTION FROM STATE COURT TO
FEDERAL COURT

vs.
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality,
Defendant.

Case N a

Judge

Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1443 and 1446, defendant Layton City, through its attorneys,
hereby gives NOTICE OF REMOVAL of the civil action pending against it in the Second District
Court of the County of Davis, State of Utah, to this Court. Layton City alleges as grounds for
removal the following:
1.

On March 19, 2002, Layton City was served with a Summons and Amended

Complaint in the civil action titled Machelle Canfield v. Lavton City, a Utah municipality. Civil
No. 020800412, which commenced in the Second Judicial District Court in and for the County of
Davis, State of Utah.

2.

The Amended Complaint alleges an equal protection claim under a federal statute,

42 U.S.C. § 1983.
3.

This Court has original jurisdiction of the above-entitled action, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1331, and hence, this action may be removed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1441, 1443. Copies of the Summons and Amended Complaint are attached hereto.
WHEREFORE, defendant Layton City hereby submits notice that the above-entitled
matter is removed from the Second Judicial District Court in and for the County of Davis, State
of Utah, to this Court, in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1446.
DATED this 8th day of April, 2002.
SNOW, CHRJSTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By \H^y-

fliKln

Stanley J. Preston
A
Camille N. Johnson
Maralyn M. Reger
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City
N:\13607\520\Plcadings\Removal-Federal Ctwpd
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT 4

STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119)
CAMILLE N. JOHNSON (A5494)
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000
Fax No.: (801)363-0400

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
MACHELLE CANFIELD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality,

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR AN
ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO
FILE A SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT THAT STATES
CLEARLY ANY CAUSE OF ACTION
ASSERTED AGAINST LAYTON CITY

Defendant.
Case No. 1:02-CV-00041 K
Judge Dale A. Kimball
Magistrate Judge Ronald Boyce

Pursuant to the Court's inherent authority, defendant Layton City ("the City") respectfully
submits this memorandum in support of its motion for an order requiring plaintiff to file a
Second Amended Complaint that states clearly any cause of action asserted against the City.

RELEVANT FACTS
1.

On March 18, 2002, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in the Second Judicial

District Court for Davis County, Bountiful Department, State of Utah.
2.

The City received a copy of the Amended Complaint and Summons on March 29,

3.

Based upon the Amended Complaint, the City believed that plaintiff was

2002.

attempting to assert an Equal Protection claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On April 8, 2002,
the City removed the action on that basis.
4.

On April 12, 2002, plaintiff filed a pleading in this Court, in which plaintiff

demanded a trial by jury and acknowledged notice of the case's removal from state court to
federal court. Plaintiff did not file an objection to the removal.
5.

On May 9, 2002, plaintiffs attorney and the City's attorney met telephonically,

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f). Plaintiffs attorney did not object to the
removal or assert that there was no basis for removal. An Attorneys' Planning Meeting Report,
signed by plaintiffs attorney, was submitted to the Court on May 22, 2002.
6.

On July 8, 2002, plaintiff served her initial disclosures. The City served its initial

disclosures on July 12, 2002.
7.

On July 16, 2002, the City served its first set of interrogatories and document

requests on plaintiff. Plaintiff did not file any objections to the City's discovery requests.
8.

An initial pretrial conference was held in this matter on August 22,2002. During

the initial pretrial conference, Magistrate Boyce stated that it was unclear from the Amended
-2-

Complaint whether plaintiff was asserting an Equal Protection claim. Plaintiffs attorney, in
open court, responded that the plaintiff was asserting a "disparate treatment" claim under Layton
City policies, not an Equal Protection claim.
9.

On August 22, 2002, the parties were ordered to show cause why this case should

not be remanded to state court.
ARGUMENT
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and must, as a threshold matter, determine
questions of jurisdiction. SeeMontoya v. Chao, 296 F.3d 952, 955 (10th Cir. 2002). Based upon
the Amended Complaint plaintiff filed in state court, the City believed that plaintiff was
attempting to assert an Equal Protection claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The City removed
the action on that basis. Months later, after an attorneys' planning report was filed, initial
disclosures were made, and discovery requests were served, plaintiffs attorney, in response to a
question by Magistrate Boyce at the initial pretrial hearing, stated for the first time that the
plaintiff was asserting a "disparate treatment" claim under the City's policies, not an Equal
Protection claim. No such actionable claim exists, and use of the phrase "disparate treatment"
gives rise to equal protection issues.1
The Court has now ordered the parties to show cause why the case should not be
remanded to state court. However, based on the vagueness of the Amended Complaint, it is
unclear what cause of action plaintiff is attempting to assert, and whether she has attempted to

*The Court's Order to Show Cause references civil service standards; however, Layton
City does not have a civil service commission.
-3-

state a claim under the United States Constitution or a federal statute. Thus, it cannot be
determined, based upon the current state of the pleadings, whether this Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over this action.
Accordingly, the City respectfully moves the Court for an order requiring plaintiff to file
a Second Amended Complaint that states clearly any cause of action asserted against the City.
DATED this Kcfa day of August, 2002.
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU

Stanley J. Piston J
Camille N.uohinspn
Maralyn M. Rigger
Attorneys for Defendant

N:\13607\520\Pleadings\DefinitcStatcmcntMem.wpd

-4-

ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT 5

FILED
IN THE UNITED STAT£S DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT O F U T A H

_
: ; ! !P,T

'

22 AUG 02 PM 3=31
CENTRAL DIVISION

DISTRiCT OF UTAH
BY:.
DEPUTY CLERK

MACHELLE CANFIELD.
Plaintiff(s)

Case No. 02-NC-41 DK

v.
LAYTON CITY,

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Defendant(s).

The above entitled matter was removed 'from state court on defendant's
contention that plaintiff was asserting a claim under 4 2 USC § 1 9 8 3 . The plaintiff
did not allege such a claim and at pretrial before the magistrate judge plaintiff's
counsel asserted there was no federal equal protection claim being pursued.
Therefore, the case involves only state issues of violation of plaintiff's rights under
Layton City's civil service standards. Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the parties shall, on or before September 2 8 , 2 0 0 2 ,
show cause w h y this case should not be remanded to state court under 28 USC §
1441(c) and § 1447(c).
DATED this t)Q-

day of August . 2 0 0 2 .
BY THE COURT:

^
)ale Kimball, Judge
United States District Court

$s*c&

Dodged lor:
Docketed by:

Secretary

ce
United States District Court
for the
District of Utah
August 23, 20 02
* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF CLERK. * *
l:02-cv-00041

ie and correct copies of the attached were either mailed or faxed by the
srk to the following:
Brad C. Smith, Esq.
STEVENSON & SMITH
3 9 86 WASHINGTON BLVD
OGDEN, UT
84403
Stanley J. Preston, Esq.
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 EXCHANGE PLACE
PO BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY, UT
84145-5000
JFAX 9,3630400

ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT 6

STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119)
CAMILLEN.JOHNSON (A5494)
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468)
SNOW, CHR]STENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000
Fax No.: (801)363-0400

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
MACHELLE CANFIELD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality,
Defendant.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR AN
ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO
FILE A SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT THAT STATES
CLEARLY ANY CAUSE OF ACTION
ASSERTED AGAINST LAYTON CITY
Case No. 1:02-CV-00041 K
Judge Dale A. Kimball
Magistrate Judge Ronald Boyce

Pursuant to the Court's inherent authority, defendant Layton City ("the City") respectfully
moves the Court for an order requiring plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint that states
clearly any cause of action asserted against the City.
Based upon the Amended Complaint plaintiff filed in state court, the City believed that
plaintiff was attempting to assert an Equal Protection claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The

City removed the action on that basis. Months later, after an attorneys' planning report was filed,
initial disclosures were made, and discovery requests were served, plaintiffs attorney, in
response to a question by Magistrate Boyce at the initial pretrial hearing, stated for the first time
that the plaintiff was not asserting an Equal Protection claim. The Court has now ordered the
parties to show cause why the case should not be remanded to state court. However, based on the
vagueness of the Complaint, it is now unclear what claim plaintiff is asserting and whether this
Court has jurisdiction over this matter.
Accordingly, the City respectfully moves the Court for an order requiring the plaintiff to
file a Second Amended Complaint that states clearly any cause of action asserted against the
City.
DATED this ^pft day of August, 2002.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Stanley J. Preston
S
Camille Nl^Fohpstfn
Maralyn M. Reger
Attorneys for Defendant

N:\l 3607\520\Pleadings\DefinitcStatcmcntMotion.wpd

-2-

ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT 7

STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119)
CAMILLEN.JOHNSON (A5494)
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468)
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000
Fax No.: (801)363-0400

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
MACHELLE CANFIELD,
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE T O
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 1:02-CV-00041 K
LA V 1 ON CITS, \i Utah municipality,
Judge Dale A. Kimball
Defendant.
Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba

Defendant Layton City ("the City") respectfully submits this response to the Court's
Order to Show Cause why this case should not be remandni u i Miii

in

RELEVANT FACTS
1.

On March 18,2002, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in the Second Judicial

District Court for Davis County, Bouni

epartment, State i>l' 11: .>!•

i . , , ui \\v /\\\\< ruled

Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The Amended Complaint does not identify a "cause
of action" or "claim for relief."
2.

The City received a copy of the Amended Complaint and Summons on March 29,

3.

Based upon the allegations of the Amended Complaint, the City believed that

2002.

plaintiff was attempting to assert an Equal Protection claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On
April 8, 2002, the City removed the action on the grounds that this Court had original jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331.
4.

On April 12, 2002, plaintiff filed a pleading in this Court, in which plaintiff

demanded a trial by jury and acknowledged notice of the case's removal from state court to
federal court. Plaintiff did not file an objection to the removal.
5.

On May 9, 2002, plaintiffs attorney and the City's attorney met telephonically,

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f). Plaintiffs attorney did not object to the
removal or assert that there was no basis for removal. An Attorneys' Planning Meeting Report,
signed by plaintiffs attorney, was submitted to the Court on May 22, 2002.
6.

On July 8, 2002, plaintiff served her initial disclosures. The City served its initial

disclosures on July 12,2002.
7.

On July 16, 2002, the City served its first set of interrogatories and document

requests on plaintiff. Plaintiff did not file any objections to the City's discovery requests.

8.

An initial pretrial conference was held in this matter on August 22, 2002. During

the initial pretrial conference, Magistrate Boyce stated that it was unclear from the Amended
>al Protection claim. I lii i:i itifPs attorney, ii \
open court, responded that the plaintiff was asserting a "disparate treatment" claim under Layton
City policies, not an EqUaj Protection claim.
Ii :i ligl it ()! plaintiffs attorney's comments, counsel for the City asked, in writing,
that plaintiffs attorney identify with specificity the plaintiffs claim.

File a Second Amended Complaint that States Clearly any Cause of Action Asserted Against
Layton City.
11

City's Motion, however he did

respond in writing to the City's request that he identify with specificity his client's claim. Mr.
Smith's September 20, 2002 letter to counsel for the City prov it I* ?
Ms. Canfield's claim is one for constructive termination on the basis that Layton
City failed to follow its own termination policy and deprived Ms. Canfield of her
job without due process of law.
I suppose as to the depravation [sic] of due process Federal'Fourteenth
Amendment case law would be implicated.
See September 20,2002 letter attached hereto as Exhibit B.

-3-

ARGUMENT
Based upon the Amended Complaint plaintiff filed in state court, the City believed that
plaintiff was attempting to assert an Equal Protection claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
City removed the action on that basis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question
jurisdiction). Months later, after an attorneys' planning report was filed, initial disclosures were
made, and discovery requests were served, plaintiffs attorney, in response to a question by
Magistrate Boyce at the initial pretrial hearing, stated for the first time that the plaintiff was
asserting a "disparate treatment" claim under the City's policies, not an Equal Protection claim.
No such actionable claim exists, and use of the phrase "disparate treatment" gives rise to equal
protection issues.1 Now, plaintiffs attorney has identified his client's claim as one for
deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
See Exhibit B. That being the case, this Court has original jurisdiction of the case under 28
U.S.C. § 1331,2 and the case should not be remanded to state court.
The City asks not only that this Court retain jurisdiction of this case, but that it grant the
City's Motion for an Order Requiring Plaintiff to File a Second Amended Complaint that States
Clearly any Cause of Action Asserted Against Layton City. The vagueness of the Amended

]

The Court's Order to Show Cause references civil service standards; however, Layton
City does not have a civil service commission.
2

28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."

Complaint can only be remedied with an amendment which pleads the cause of action plaintiff

DATED this <&Sft day of September, 2002.
SNOW ,(11 k IS i b N KII II4 k M, \ I (1 IN LA U

Stanley L Prestoj
Camille>L-J<5linson
Maralyn M. Reger
Attorneys for Defendant

N i l 3607\520\Pleadings\Rcsponse OSC.wpd
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S
RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (Case No. 1:02CV00041, United Slates
District Court, District of Utah) was served on the parties listed below by first class mail,
postage prepaid, this J ^ - d a y of September, 2002.

Brad C. Smith
STEVENSON & SMITH
3986 Washington Boulevard
Ogden,Utah 84403
Attorneys for Plaintiff

EXHIBIT A

KTO i::52 FAX SOI 646 S

lgj w « »

LAYTON CITY ADMIN.

Brad C. Smith. N O . tfcbf
STEVENSON & SMITH. P.C
2605 Washington Blvd . Zv ,
Ogden, Utah B4401
Telephones (801) 394-4573

,0

Attorneys for Plaintiff
TN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT F O R DAVJS COUNTY
STATE O P UTAH
MACHEIdJE CANFIELD,

""

"""

:~

Plaintiff,

LAYTON CITY, a
municipality,

:

AMKNDKJL,

• r«ni ',/iJ.tri

i

Civil N o . 020800412
Judge: Glen R. Dawson

h
•

Defendant.
Comes n o w Plaintiff, b y and through counsel, and complains
and alleges

\ follows:

Mac: 1 ml ] e Canfield is a resident oi W e b e r County, State of
Utah.
Defendant Layton Cit>
Davis county, SLCIL
j„

Utah municipality, locate I m
-

Venue a n d jurisdiction arc proper , n the CIEJOVM r m i i .« > n
court.

/21/02
D/02
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WED 12:52 FAX 801 546 8
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4.

plaintiff was employed as a police department dispatcher fox
Defendant, Layton City,.

Prior to July 2001, Plaintiff had

been employed by Defendant for in excess of thirteen (13)
years.

During that period of time she was a police

dispatcher.

Approximately six months prior to the

termination of her employment, Plaintiff was placed under
the charge of a new supervisor, Lisa Murdock.
5>

Ms. Murdock unfairly and unjustly scrutinized the work
performance of Plaintiff and created a hostile, tense and
stressful environment, in an area that is already stress

4

*

ridden.

sg T »

111 s

hi*

6.

On 12 June 2001, Plaintiff left work due to stress and
informed Lisa Murdock that she was going to take her

* 81*

I1!*

daughter to the doctor'6 office.

Plaintiff reported said

hours on her time sheet.
7.

Due to the stress situation, Plaintiff decided it was best
not: to go back to work until Lit, Moyes had returned and we
could resolve the situation.

Plaintiff spoke with Lt. Moyes

on Monday morning, June 11th, and he had asked if Plaintiff
should be alright until he got back.

Plaintiff thought she

would.
8.

On Tuesday, the 12th, Plaintiff left 4.5 hours early, and
that evening she called dispatch to have her shift filled
for the next day.

WED 3?:fi,¥ FAX *"nl *46 «

LAYTON CITY ADMIN.

$.

IfcJiiWO

ifciff back and said that Plaintiff needed to
be

tn

laintiff went

wt

tune iij cw «_-.*

i
* the morning, Las a asked

if she needed to leave.

could «Oci

lunch and go home early it would t * better

. :r»

would see what

"
relief

Lisa came u p several hours later and told
i mi in i I

I I. £ assumed that meant

«,§- > ^. ..

going home

early.
IU.

ui" "be meantime Plaintiff's daughter called on be rt ij phone
and said M

i I.IM Y

and ankle wer-p hurting from t h e

basketball camp that morning.

(She has

injuries) ,
11

" • -i IM" p.ii'

I ,,! -

she could leave.
>t'N.

.•

"

'i « " «i "-

P » i i" i i, h a n d told Plaintiff

Plaintiff w a s surprised

I" "

-

she-would need a doctor's

excuse for the one iiour
12.

Plaintiff i i; informed and believes, and thereupon - leges,
t j i a t nUftieroua

-ity have used sick leave in the
I hnii nut'i it.1*: '
"
i i ••) •

same manner as Plaintiff but have
• i proceeding whatsoevei
has been treated differently

merely than

"""her employees of Defendant, all
Defendant' 8 specif 31
u.

I/,I i" ! " "

Officers, employees, .agents

Accordingly # Plaintiff

contravention » i
| •

f«i' servants of Defendant

D/02

WED 1 2 : S 3 FAX SOI 546 9

LAYTON CITY ADMIN.

confronted Plaintiff with the allegation that Plaintiff had
misused sick leave and gave her an ultimatum that she resign
from the city or face termination.

Because of her fear that

a termination would preclude her from obtaining future
gainful employment, Plaintiff and reluctantly and against
her will accepted termination.
14.

Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges
that other employees of City have been subject to
allegations regarding misuse of sick leave and/or other
instances in which they have been accused, rightly or
wrongly, of stealing city property, misusing city time or
similar allegations.

III*

15.

MB1

Plaintiff is informed and believes and there upon alleges
that said individuals have not been punished as severely as
she has, have not been terminated, or not given an
ultimatum, but instead, were given employee warnings,
probation, and other punishment.

16.

Defendant's personnel policy specifically require that
Plaintiff be treated fairly and that any punishments or
discipline given to her be proportionate to the offense
alleged*

Defendant's punishment of Plaintiff, including its

termination of her, was disproportionate to the acts
alleged, even if the acts were taken as true.

WED 1 2 : 8 3 FAX SO! 848 I

UYTON CITY ADMIN.

WHEREFORE,

i«JS7

dgment against Defendant as

follows;
1.

imount to be proven at
* reinstatement or other appropriii (

3.

trial.

r *u * If .

costs of r; niui L djid attorney'5 fees as the same may
be allowed 'by law.

^.

i rir such other and furthei
j

as the court deertve

proper.

u s t

DATED t h i s

relief

/£

day of Marc^ 2002.
Brad C. Smith
A t t o r n e y f o r pi •*• i""tt i if

Plaintiffs Address:
3552 W. 5000 S.
Hnv. Utah, 84067

EXHIBIT B

STEVENSON & SMITH
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
H. T H O M A S £BRAD C. SMIT*
•ADMITTED m Ui*

3986 W A S H I N G T O N BOULEVARD
O G D E N , UTAH 84403
1ELEF HONE (801) 3 9 9 - 9 9 1 0 OR (801) 3 9 4 - 4 5 7 3
FACSIMILE ( 8 0 1 ) 3 9 9 - 9 9 5 4

OF COUNSEL:
D A V I D S. K U N Z

September 20,2002
Camille N. Johnson
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utai
Machelle Canfield v, Layton City
Dear Camille,
You have requested that I provide you with some sort of more definitive statement as to
what my client's claims are. I thought this was covered while we were in court However, I will
oblige your request.
Ms. Canfield's claim is one for constructive termination on the basis that Layton City
failed to follow its own termination policy and deprived Ms. Canfield of her job without due
process of law.
I suppose as to the depravation of due process Federal Fourteenth Amendment case law
would be implicated. However, contrary to the representation you made in your removal
notification I have not and have not intended to assert an equal protection claim arising under 42
U.S.C. §1983. At present I am unaware of any facts which would suggest that Ms. Canfield was
denied equal protection of the law based on any invidious or forbidden group membership. I am
unaware of any evidence that would show that Ms. Canfield was terminated or subjected to a
subjective termination as a result of .her gender, age, race, religion, handicap, or national origin.
Accordingly, I do not believe there is any equal protection claim to be made here and have not
intended to make one.
If you have any other questions on this matter please iixii 1111 11»i, < miact me.
Kespallulh

Brad C. Smith
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FILED
CI.L-RK. U S . DISTRICT COURT

-I OCT 02 PM 1*56
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR TTHB WftTWriflfttfTAH
NORTHERN DIVISION *|fcpUTY C L E M "

MACHIELLE CANFIELD,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:02-CV-41 K

vs.

ORDER

LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality,
Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for An Order Requiring Plaintiff to
File a Second Amended Complaint that States Clearly any Cause of Action Asserted Against Layton
City. No response having been filed, the motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff has thirty days to
comply and file an Amended Complaint.
DATED this _L_~day

of October, 2002.
BY THE C O U R T :

SAMUEL ALBA
United States Magistrate Judge

aep
United States District Court
for the
District of Utah
October 2, 2 002
* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF CLERK * *
:

l:02-cv-00041

ae and correct copies of the attached were either mailed, faxed or e-mailed
the clerk to the following:
Brad C. Smith, Esq.
STEVENSON & SMITH
3 986 WASHINGTON BLVD
OGDEN, UT 844 03
Stanley J. Preston, Esq.
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 EXCHANGE PLACE
PO BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145-5000
EFAX 9,3630400
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STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119)
CAMILLE N. JOHNSON (A5494)
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468)
SNOW, CHRJSTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000
Fax No.: (801)363-0400

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
MACHELLE CANFIELD,
MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 1:02-CV-00041

LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality,
Defendant.

Judge Dale A. Kimball
Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba

Defendant Layton City moves to dismiss the captioned case for plaintiffs failure to
comply with the Court's October 1, 2002 Order which requires plaintiff to file a Second

Amended Complaint on or before October 31, 2002. The bas;is for this Motion is set forth with
more particularity in the accompanying Memorandum.
DATED this \ffr day of November, 2002.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

*restor
Camille(N. Johrfson
Maralyn MTReger
Attorneys for Defendant

N:\13607\520\Pieadings\Moiion to Dismiss.wpd

-2-

STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119)
CAMILLE N. JOHNSON (A5494)
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468)
SNOW, CHRJSTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000
Fax No.: (801)363-0400

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
MACHELLE CANFIELD,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.

Case No. 1:02-CV-00041
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality,
Judge Dale A. Kimball
Defendant.
Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba

Defendant Layton City submits this memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss the
captioned case for plaintiffs failure to comply with this Court's Order.
On October 1, 2002, this Court signed an Order granting Layton City's Motion to Compel
and ordering plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint that states clearly any cause of action
asserted against defendant Layton City. The Court gave plaintiff 30 days in which to comply and
file the Second Amended Complaint. See Order attached as Exhibit "A." Plaintiff has failed to

comply with the Court's Order in that she has not filed a Second Amended Complaint. For her
failure to comply, this case should be dismissed.
DATED this

|Sf> day of November, 2002.
SNOW, CHRJSTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By_
Stan![fey J. Preston )
lilleNUohnsDiT
Camille
Maralyn M. Reger
Attorneys for Defendant

N:\I3607\520\Pleadings\Memo in Support of Motion to Dismiss.wpd

-2-

EXHIBIT A

FILED
CI.ERK.US.DISTRICT CUURT

-I OCT 02 PH 1*56
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR TEHBTflfiTO^tft^JfTAH
NORTHERN DIVISION * ^ p U T y CLEHK "

MACHIELLE CANFIELD,
Case No. 1:02-CV-41 K

Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER

LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality,
Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for An Order Requiring Plaintiff to
File a Second Amended Complaint that States Clearly any Cause of Action Asserted Against Layton
City. No response having been filed, the motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff has thirty days to
comply and file an Amended Complaint.
DATED this _ / _ _ ^ a y of October, 2002.
BYTHECOURT:

SAMUEL ALBA
United States Magistrate Judge

asp
United States District Court
for the
District of Utah
October 2, 2002
* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF CLERK * *
Re:

l:02-cv-00041

True and correct copies of the attached were either mailed, faxed or e-mai]
by the clerk to the following:
Brad C. Smith, Esq.
STEVENSON & SMITH
3986 WASHINGTON BLVD
OGDEN, UT 84403
Stanley J. Preston, Esq.
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 EXCHANGE PLACE
PO BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145-5000
EFAX 9,3630400
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FILED
18 N0VQ2PM 2^5
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE D I S T R I O ^ $ $ F \ $ $ A M UTAH
BY=
NORTHERN DIVISION
DEPUTY CLERK
MACHELLE CANFIELD,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
vs.

LAYTON CITY,
Case No. 1:02CV41K
Defendant.

On October 1, 2002, this court issued an Order requiring Plaintiff, within thirty days, to
file a Second Amended Complaint that states clearly any cause of action asserted against Layton
City. As of the date of this Order, Plaintiff has not complied with the court's Order.
Based upon Plaintiffs failure to comply, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs
case is DISMISSED.

.

DATED this / P ? a v of November, 2002.
BY THE COURT:

U^XJZ.
DALE A. KIM.

a^7

United States District Judge

92-

asp
United StateB District Court
for the
District of Utah
November 19, 2002
* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF CLERK * *
l:02-cv-00041

jie and correct copies of the attached were either mailed, faxed or e-mailed
the clerk to the following:
Brad C. Smith, Esq.
STEVENSON & SMITH
3 98 6 WASHINGTON BLVD
OGDEN, UT 844 03
Stanley J. Preston, Esq.
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 EXCHANGE PLACE
PO BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145-5000
EFAX 9,3 63 04 00

ADDENDUM
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Brad C. Smith, NO. 6656
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
3986 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84403
Telephone: (801) 394-4573
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH
MACHELLE CANFIELD,
Plaintiff,

:

PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO
DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES

VS.

Civil No. 1:02-CV-00041 K
LAYTON CITY, a Utah
municipality,

Judge: Dale A. Kimball

Defendant.
Comes now Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and answers
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories as follows:
Interrogatory Ho. 1; Identify each person whom you
anticipate that you will call or may call as a witness at the
time of trial of this matter and state the topic or subject
matter upon which each such witnesses will testify, the substance
of the testimony of each witness with respect to each topic or
subject matter, and the identity of all documents which relate to
or concern any such testimony.
Answer to Interrogatory No, 1: Plaintiff has not yet
determined who she will call as witnesses at the time of trial,

when this determination is made, Plaintiff will supplement this
interrogatory.

Plaintiff anticipates that her witnesses may

include: Debbie PettiJohn, Layton Police Dispatch; Laree Hopkins,
Layton Police Dispatch; Debbie Joubert, Layton Police Dispatch;
Blake Haycock, Layton Police Officer; Lt. Quinn Moyes, Layton
Police; and Lisa Murdock, Layton Police Dispatch.

The above

named individuals have knowledge of the circumstances of my
separation with Layton City, my "Garrity" hearing, my use of sick
leave, and my job performance.
Interrogatory No, 2; Identify all documents that you
anticipate presenting to a witness or the trier of the fact at
^ n "? o
_ ^ A a>

the trial of this matter, whether as an exhibit or otherwise.
Answer to Interrogatory No, 2; Machelle Canfield's Leave

< r g g
-* o o

w

CD O

X

K

•

£j o

O

Time.Sheet, Memorandum to Lt. Quinn Moyes from Plaintiff. Machelle
Canfield, Certificate to return to work or school from IHC Health
Center. Plaintiff has not yet determined who she will call as
witnesses at the time of trial, when .this determination is made,
Plaintiff will supplement this interrogatory.
Interrogatory No, 3; Describe with specificity all damages
Ms. Canfield claims she has suffered as a result of the actions
of the City complained of in her Amended Complaint, and all
information concerning any such damages, including, without
limitation: the precise nature of the damages suffered, the
amount of any such damages, how each damages amount was

calculated or estimated, and identify each person involved in
calculating such damages or who otherwise has knowledge of the
basis for and method of calculation for such damages and
summarize each such person's involvement and/or knowledge.
Answer to Interrogatory No, 3:
Past Wages
2 July 2001 - 9 January 2002
unemployed:
at Layton:
17.26/hr. X 40 x (211 days / 7)
= $20,810.63
15 January 2002 - 5 July 2002
IRS
(17.26 - 11.50) x 40 x (171 / 7)
= $5,628.34
Future Wages
5 July 2002 - 2022
(17.26 - 11.50) x 40 x 52 x 20 = $239,616.00
Plaintiff is also entitled to general damages for suffering
and humiliation.

Plaintiff anticipates claiming an amount equal

to front and back pay for general damages.
The following individuals would have knowledge of the basis
for and method of calculation for economic damages as they were
her superiors and they participated in her performance reviews
and have knowledge of her hourly wage, etc.:
Lt. Quinn Moyes# Layton Police Dept. , 429 N. Wasatch Dr, Layton
801-546-8300
Chief Terry Keefe, Layton Police Dept., 429 N. Wasatch Dr, Layton
801-546-8300

3

the nature of the employment sought, identify each person you
communicated with, identify all documents that refer or relate to
contact with that person or entity, and describe the outcome of
your contact with that individual or entity.
Answer to Interrogatory No, 10: See response to Request for
Production of Documents No. 13.
Interrogatory No. 11; If you are aware of the existence of
any written or recorded statement made by any party or potential
witness, identify the person making the statement, the date of
the statement, a summary of the contents of the statement, the
name, address, telephone number and occupation of the person or
persons taking the statemsmt, and the name, address and telephone
number of the person now in possession of the original statement.
Answer to Interrogatory No. 11: Plaintiff is aware that her
"Garrity" hearing was partially recorded.
DATED this ^

day of .£*§|fst, 2002.
Machelle Canfield/J
Plaintiff
IS

Plaintiff's Address:
3552 W. 5000 S.
Roy, Utah 84067

7

rj

STATE OF UTAH
ss.
COUNTY OF WEBER

)

On the y day of jB^^t^J 2002, at Ogden, Utah, personally
appeared before me Machelle Canfield, the signer of the within
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the
same.

lUam.

Notary Public

JULIE S.WILLIAMS
863 25TH STREET
OGDEN, UT 84414
MyCommUalonE*p1r«s
JUNE 28, 2003
gf At I 0^ UTAH

RY PUBLIC
ding at Ogden, Utah

My Commission Expires

b--d%-a
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Introduction
The following personnel policies (3000 and 4000 series) set forth City policies and
procedures for personnel administration, risk management and safety, as well as the
conditions of employment with the City and the basis for compensation and benefits.
The information contained in these policies shall be considered official policy of the Layton
City Corporation arid may be revised from time to time by the City Manager or City
Council with or without notice to the employee. The official interpretation of all matters
dealt with in this manual shall be the responsibility of the City Manager.

The policiesjmd statements contained in this maymal and In other \
he issued from time to time, do not create a contract or agreement of anv kind MWftffft
flM Citv and its employees. Although thev reflect current policy, thev mav. at anv time
and for anv reason, with or without notice to employees, be changed or rescinded.

Department Directors may, with the approval of the City Manager, establish additional
policies and procedures as they deem necessary for the efficient and orderly administration
and supervision of their departments, provided that they do not conflict with policies and
procedures established in this manual.

1of2
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Philosophy of Service
The purpose of the City is to provide those services which the City Council deems
necessary and desirable for the general health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of Lay ton.
Essentially, all that each City employee does should be for the public benefit and advantage
of the people residing within the corporate limits of Layton City, thus promoting their
greater prosperity and general welfare.
Specifically, the purpose of each department of the City is to provide the highest possible
level of service at the most reasonable cost to the citizens.
Employment Philosophy
The quality of the services provided by the City is dependent upon the individual initiative
and responsibility of its employees. Successful employees are self-motivated, perceptive,
problem-solvers, service-oriented, have an eye for detail, and follow a job through to its
completion in a professional manner.
Most work in the City is accomplished on a team basis. A productive and successful
employee is expected to be able to work with others in a cooperative manner to accomplish*
the purpose of the City. The unifying force of team action is communication. To this end,
pertinent job-related information must be shared and communicated with all others in the
City who have an interest or concern in the outcome of any job or endeavor.
The City, therefore, seeks to attract and retain the most highly qualified and competent
employees who exhibit the qualities and characteristics consistent with the job to be
performed.
Enforcement Qf Ppligies and Procedures
The Department Director should enforce the City's Personnel Policies and Procedures and
implement all procedures necessary to carry out the responsibilities of their respective
departments consistent with these policies. The Department Director should notify .all
departmental employees of these policies and any amendments.

Perspnnsl Administration
The administration of all personnel matters, except those specifically reserved by the City
Council, are the responsibility of the City Manager. The City Manager may delegate these
responsibilities to the Assistant City Manager. The City Manager or Assistant City
Manager, as authorized, shall administer the personnel system provided by this personnel
policy pursuant to approved rules and regulations and applicable law.
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Appeals/Greivances Not Involving Termination or Transfer Discipline
If a Layton City employee wishes to appeal a performance evaluation, disciplinary action, or
register a grievance, the supervisor should instruct the employee in the following procedures:
1. A written notification of appeal must be filed with the Department Director within 5
working days of the interview for the performance evaluation, disciplinary action or
grievance, except as described in Paragraph 7.
In cases involving the appeal of a performance evaluation, this notification should state
the specific reason(s) why the appraisal is being appealed.
2. The Department Director will meet with the supervisor and with the employee separately
to discuss the appeal and obtain relevant information.
3. The Department Director will then determine if the appeal has merit.
4. If the Department Director determines that the appeal does have merit, a meeting will be
held with the employee, the supervisor, the Department Director, and the Personnel
Department to discuss an appropriate resolution to the situation.
5. If the Department Director determines that the appeal does not have merit, the employee
will be informed, in writing, of the Department Director's decision. Written notification
of denial of an appeal will be made within fifteen working days from the time the original
written appeal was filed.
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6. If the employee wishes to pursue the appeal further, the employee may file a written
notice of appeal with the City Manager within five working days from the time he
received notice that the original appeal was officially denied. The City Manager will
then review the facts of the situation, interview the involved parties, and make a written
determination regarding the appeal within fifteen working days.
7. If an employee's supervisor is a Department Director, the written appeal may be filed
directly with the City Manager within five working days of the interview for the
performance evaluation, disciplinary action or grievance. The Department Director will
then be notified of the appeal and the City Manager will handle the appeal process in
place of the Department Director, as outlined in Numbers 2 through 5 above. The City
Manager's decision on an appeal will be final.
Appeals of Termination or Transfer to a Position of Less Remuneration
(See chapter 2.55 of the Lay ton City Municipal Code)
Right of Appeal
No appointive officer or employee covered by Section 10-3-1105 U.C.A. shall be discharged
or transferred to a position with less remuneration because of his or her politics or religious
beliefs, or incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, governing body or
heads of departments. In all cases where an appointive officer or regular full time employee,
other than the City Manager and heads of departments, is discharged or transferred to a
position with less remuneration for any reason, the officer or regular full time employee shall
have the right to appeal such discharge or transfer in accordance with this chapter.
Appeal Procedure
All administrative appeals shall be processed according to the following procedure:
(1) The appeal shall be taken by filing a written notice of such appeal with the personnel
director within ten days after discharge or transfer. Upon filing of such appeal, the
personnel director shall forthwith refer a copy of the same to said appeal board. Upon
receipt of the referral from the personnel director, the appeal board shall forthwith
commence its investigation, take and receive evidence, and fully hear and determine the
matter which relates to the cause for such discharge or transfer,
(2) TTie officer or employee shall be entitled to appear in person and to be represented by
counsel, to have a public hearing, to confront any witness whose testimony is to be
considered, to call witnesses, and to examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal
board.
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(3) In the event the appeal board upholds the discharge or transfer, the officer or employee
may have fourteen days thereafter to appeal to the City Manager whose decision shall be
final.
(4) In the event the appeal board does not uphold the discharge or transfer, then the
supervisor or department head may have fourteen days thereafter to appeal to the
governing body of the city whose decision shall be final after hearing the evidence in the
same manner as provided for in the appeal to the appeal board.
Appeal Board
There is hereby created an appeal board to consist of five members, two of whom shall be
members of the governing body and three of whom shall be chosen by and from the
appointive officers and employees of the city.
Selection of Board Members
The city recorder will give notice that applications and nominations are being accepted for
the appeal board. Any officer or employee may apply or may nominate another officer or
employee. The city recorder shall establish a reasonable notice procedure and time period
for this process. All people nominated will be notified and given an opportunity to accept
the nomination or withdraw their name from consideration. At the end of the application/nomination period the city recorder shall forward all remaining names to the City
Manager. The members of the appeal board shall be selected through an election which shall
be conducted by the city recorder and which allows all appointive officers and regular full
time employees of the city an opportunity to cast a vote. In addition to the three appointive
officers and regular full time employees elected to the board, alternate members shall also
be elected to serve on the board in the event of an absence or if a conflict of interest should
arise involving another board member.
Election of Board Members
The City Manager shall present the names of five officers or employees to be considered by
the general body of employees of Layton City 4o sit on the appeal board. These names shall
be given to the city recorder. After receiving the names, the city recorder shall then prepare
a ballot for the election of said appeal board members. Votes shall be cast, either yes or no,
in favor of each individual nominee by the city employees. If all are affirmed the City
Manager will determine which members are to be the alternates. If any are not affirmed, by
receiving yes votes totaling less than 50% of the votes cast, the City Manager shall present
an additional name or names, in a number equivalent to those not affirmed, for a second
election process. The two board members to be chosen from the governing body shall be
appointed by the mayor.

3 of 5

3802

Conflict of Interest
No member of the appeal board shall hear an appeal from the department in which the
member is employed or administers. Nor shall a member hear an appeal in which the member
is related to the appealing employee through blood or marriage. For purposes of this section,
related persons shall include and be limited to: father, mother, husband, wife, son, daughter,
sister, brother, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, first cousin, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brotherin-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law or daughter-in-law.
Vacancy on the Board
If a vacancy occurs on the board the member shall be replaced by the first alternate board
member in the case of an appointed officer or employee. The City Manager shall then
present a name for the election process. This newest member then becomes the second
alternate.
In the case of a vacancy by a member of the governing body, the mayor shall appoint a
replacement for the remainder of the term.
No Compensation for Board Members
Members of the appeal board shall receive no compensation for services.
Quorum
Three or more members of the appeals board shall constitute a quorum sufficient to hear
appeals.
Board Decisions
The decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall be certified to the
personnel director within fifteen days from the date the matter is referred to it. The board
may, in its decision, provide that an employee shall receive his/her salary for the period of
time during which he is discharged, or any deficiency in salary for the period he was
transferred to a position of less remuneration but not to exceed a fifteen day period. In no
case shall the appointive officer or employee be discharged or transferred, where an appeal
is taken, except upon a concurrence of the City Manager.
Counting Board Ballots
After balloting, the decision shall be counted, and revealed in the presence of the same
members that voted. A simple majority of quorum voting will determine the decision. A
member may not abstain from voting. The voting shall be limited to upholding or reversing
the decision before the board on appeal.
4 of 5
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Board Reverses Decision and Employee Salary
In the event that the appeal board does not uphold the discharge or transfer to a position of
less remuneration, the recorder shall certify the decision to the employee affected, and also
to the head of the department from whose order the appeal was taken. The employee shall
be paid his salary, commencing with the next working day following the certification by the
recorder of the appeal boards decision, provided that the employee, or officer concerned,
reports for his assigned duties during that next working day.
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ADDENDUM
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MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT

10-3-1105. Appointive officers and employees
and termination of term of office.

10-3-1106

Duration

All appointive officers and employees of municipalities, other than members
of the police departments, fire departments, heads of departments, and
superintendents, shall hold their employment without limitation of time, being
subject to discharge or dismissal only as hereinafter provided.
History: C. 1953,10-3-1105, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 48, § 3.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Removal.

ANALYSIS

Construction.
De facto officer.
Duration of term.
Removal.
—Council to concur.
—Right to appeal.
—Who holds power.
—Without cause.

—Council to concur.
The consent of a majority of the council is
necessary for removal of officer. State ex rel.
Breeden v. Sheets, 26 Utah 105, 72 P. 334
(1903).
Assuming that the city marshal was rightfully holding office, the attempt by the mayor to
remove him without the concurrence of the
council was wholly ineffectual. Henriod v.
Church, 52 Utah 134, 172 P. 701 (1918).

Construction.
The language "as hereinafter provided" in
this section specifically refers to the sections
that follow. Therefore, "any officer* in § 10-31106 must mean any officer not excluded in this
section. Ward v. Richfield City, 776 P.2d 93
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), afiTd, 798 R2d 757 (Utah
1990).

—Right to appeal.
The legislature intended specifically to exclude a chief of police, and hence "head" of a
police "department," from the appeal provisions
of § 10-3-1106. Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d
757 (Utah 1990).

De facto officer.
Where the person in possession of a city office
is at most only a de facto officer, he is subject to
removal at any time and is not in a position to
complain of the city council's action abolishing
office. McAllister v. Swan, 16 Utah 1, 50 P. 812
(1897).

—Who holds power.
When this section is read in connection with
former § 10-6-30 (see present § 10-3-916), it
will be seen that the same authorities who have
the power of appointment, the mayor and city
council, have the power of removal. Taylor v.
Gunderson, 107 Utah 437,154 P.2d 653 (1944).

Duration of term.
City marshal's term will not in any event last
beyond the next municipal election even though
no successor be appointed. Taylor v. Gunderson,
107 Utah 437, 154 P.2d 653 (1944).

—Without cause.
It is the legislative intent that a city marshal
in cities of the third class may be removed
without cause. Taylor v. Gunderson, 107 Utah
437, 154 P.2d 653 (1944).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations
§§ 496 to 501, 552, 719.
AX.R. — Pre-employment conduct as ground
for discharge of civil service employee having

permanent status, 4 A.L.R.3d 488.
Determination as to good faith in abolition of
public service or employment subject to civil
service or merit system, 87 A.L.R.3d 1165.

10-3-1106. Discharge or transfer — Appeals
Procedure.

Board —

(1) No officer or employee covered by Section 10-3-1105 shall be discharged
or transferred to a position with less remuneration because of his politics or
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religious belief, or incident to, or through changes, either in the elective
omcers, governing body, or heads of departments. In all cases where any officer
or employee is discharged or transferred from one position to another for any
reason, he shall have the right to appeal the discharge or transfer to a board
to be known as the appeal board which shall consist of five members, three of
whom shall be chosen by and from the appointive officers and employees, and
two of whom shall be members of the governing body.
(2) The appeal shall be taken by filing written notice of the appeal with the
recorder within ten days after the discharge or transfer. Upon the filing of the
appeal the city recorder shall forthwith refer a copy of the same to the appeal
board. Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal
board shall forthwith commence its investigation, take and receive evidence
and hilly hear and determine the matter which relates to the cause for the
discharge or transfer.
(3) The employee shall be entitled to appear in person and to be represented
by counsel, to have a public hearing, to confront the witness whose testimony
is to be considered, and to examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal
(4) In the event the appeal board upholds the discharge or transfer, the
omcer or employee may have 14 days thereafter to appeal to the governing
body whose decision shall be final. In the event the appeal board does not
uphold the discharge or transfer the case shall be closed and no further
proceedmgs shall be had.
S I 1 ? ? dlCision o f t h e a p p e a l b o a r d shaa b e b y secret ballot, and shall be
certified to the recorder with 15 days from the date the matter is referred to it.
ihe board may, in its decision, provide that an employee shall receive his
salary for the period of time during which he is discharged, or any deficiency
in salary for the period he was transferred to a position of less remuneration
but not to exceed a 15 day period. In no case shall the appointive officer or
employee be discharged or transferred, where an appeal is taken, except upon
a concurrence of at least a majority of the membership of the governing body
of the municipality.
(6) In the event that the appeal board does not uphold the discharge, or
transfer, the recorder shall certify the decision to the employee affected, and
also to the head of the department from whose order the appeal was taken. The
employee shall be paid his salary, commencing with the next working day
following the certification by the recorder of the appeal board's decision,
provided that the employee, or officer, concerned reports for his assigned duties
during that next working day.
? ) i. T h f m e t h o d a n d m a nner of choosing the members of the appeal board,
and the designation of their terms of office shall be prescribed by the governing
body of each municipality by ordinance, but the provisions for choosing the
three members from the appointed officers and employees shall in no way
restrict a free selection of members by the appointive officers and employees of
the municipality.
History- C. 1953,10-3-1106, enacted byy L.
1977, ch. 48, § 3.
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